$31 billion of these securities across 162 filings averaging $188 million per issue (Table 1) .
These facts raise a number of questions about securities innovations (such as TPS), bank capital structure, and regulatory capital. For example, although all BHCs would benefit from the tax advantages of using TPS rather than conventional common or preferred equity, why did BHCs wait until after the Fed's ruling to use the instrument, and why did some BHCs not issue TPS? What characteristics distinguish issuers from nonissuers and early adopters from later issuers? Moreover, considering that virtually all BHCs currently fulfill their minimum regulatory capital requirements, why did some BHCs use TPS to increase their regulatory capital?
We provide answers to these questions by proposing and testing five, not mutually exclusive, hypotheses, dealing with: (1) tax-saving attributes of TPS; (2) reductions in the effective costs of financial distress; (3) the role of growth opportunities which increased, in large measure, as a result of the removal of restrictions on interstate branching and the anticipated repeal of laws restricting BHCs from acquiring securities and insurance firms; (4) moral hazard arising from underpriced federal deposit insurance, which is reduced when BHCs' capital increases; and (5) transactions costs. In addition, we provide evidence relevant to permitting banks to include subordinated debt in Tier-1 capital.
We first test these hypotheses by investigating the stock market's reaction to the issuance of TPS. In contrast to prior event studies on the market's reaction to equity offerings, we find that the net effect of TPS filings are wealth enhancing for stockholders. TPS issuers, in particular the early adopters, experienced significant positive abnormal returns following the Federal Reserve's October 21, 1996 ruling that it would accept TPS as Tier-1 capital. BHCs that issued TPS also experienced significant positive 3-day abnormal returns around their filing dates. This finding contrasts with the negative abnormal returns reported in several studies for equity offerings by BHCs (see first Subsection of 4.3) , as well as many other studies of equity offerings.
Because TPS appear to offer considerable advantages to BHCs, we next examine why only some have taken advantage of this opportunity. In the year before TPS were sold, univariate tests reveal that issuers, compared to nonissuers, are far larger and appear to be more financially sophisticated, fund fewer loans per dollar of assets, pay a higher percentage of their net income in taxes, have relatively more preferred stock to exchange, have a greater risk of insolvency, and obtain more of their funds from FDIC-uninsured sources. Of greatest importance, issuers have relatively less total equity and Tier-1 capital. Furthermore, issuers do not use the proceeds to raise their Tier-1 capital to the levels of nonissuers; instead, they maintain their capital ratios while growing their assets faster than nonissuers. Although these differences between issuers and nonissuers hold for both 1996 and 1997, they are more pronounced in 1996. Multivariate probit models confirm the univariate findings and show that issuers and nonissuers come from distinct groups.
We use conditional event-study methods to examine the variables that determine TPS filing date abnormal returns. Stock prices of relatively poorly capitalized BHCs that use TPS to increase their Tier-1 capital experience the greatest positive market reaction. In contrast to previous studies of preferred equity issuance, we also find that abnormal returns are significantly positively related to offer size.
Finally, we find evidence that the BHCs' common stock was undervalued during the filing period and conclude that TPS enabled banks to maintain their capital ratios while using a lower-cost source of financing. This benefit allows banks to reduce their capital costs in markets for uninsured sources of funds without issuing common equity when managers believe their common equity is undervalued. This finding also offers support for proposals to allow BHCs and banks to include subordinated debt in Tier-1 capital.
The paper proceeds in five sections. Section 1 explains how TPS deals are structured, reviews nonbank corporate issuance of similar debt-equity hybrid securities, and describes BHCs' issuance of TPS. Section 2 presents our hypotheses, while Section 3 discusses our sample of BHCs and methodology. We present and analyze our empirical findings in Section 4. The last section summarizes, concludes, and draws managerial and regulatory implications.
THE STRUCTURE OF A TPS DEAL AND TERMS OF ISSUANCE
The process begins with the BHC creating a special-purpose vehicle (SPV), holding all its common equity, which is nominal. The SPV issues preferred stock in the form of TPS to investors, and lends the proceeds to the parent BHC in the form of junior-subordinated, deferrable-interest debentures under economic terms similar to the TPS. This loan (or loans in the case of multiple issues) is the sole asset of the SPV. The SPV is structured as a statutory business trust formed under state law (e.g., Delaware), which is taxed as a partnership, wherein interest on the loan flows through as dividend income to the holders of the TPS. Hence, unlike traditional preferred stock dividends, corporations do not benefit from the dividends-received deduction. To count as regulatory capital, the Federal Reserve requires that, if the BHC encounters financial distress, the SPV must have the option to defer dividend distributions for at least 20 consecutive quarters.
2 The BHC treats TPS shares as minority interest (Kalser 1997) , which is included in Tier-1 capital.
Although TPS have no stated maturity, they do have a mandatory-redemption feature. Using the longest feasible maturity (as is required by the Federal Reserve), the effective life typically is 30 years. In public retail offerings, the securities usually are callable at par after 5 years, while private institutional offerings (the 144A market) tend to be callable after 10 years at par along with a declining premium. According to Ryan, Beck & Co., the all-in costs of issuance favor public retail offerings, as they have lower expenses compared to 144A transactions. Although credit ratings are not required on TPS, they have been more common on institutional rather than on retail offerings.
Nonbank Corporate Issuance of Debt-Equity Hybrid Securities
On October 27, 1993, Texaco issued the first debt-equity hybrid security known variously, since then, as monthly-income preferred stock (MIPS), quarterly-income preferred stock (QUIPS), and trust-preferred stock (TPS), among other names.
3 By the end of 1999, almost 300 corporations, including insurance and securities firms, issued roughly $65 billion of these securities. 4 Irvine and Rosenfeld (2000) study a sample of 185 of these firms and find that 22% of them used part or all of the proceeds to retire outstanding preferred stock, showing that an important motivation for selling these securities was tax-driven.
BHC Issuance of TPS
BHCs did not issue TPS until after October 21, 1996, when issuance exploded, apparently for three reasons. First, prior to the Fed's ruling, banking authorities did not allow TPS to count as Tier-1 capital. Since insurance companies and securities firms were allowed to count such instruments as capital, the change was made primarily for competitive equity reasons. Second, BHCs' investment bankers were urging their clients to issue TPS before the end of the calendar year, citing uncertainty regarding the continued tax-advantaged status of TPS. This urging might have been motivated by the additional fee income provided by these issues. As notes, investment bankers earned more than $200 million in fees in less than 4 months of underwriting TPS issues. 5 Third, as noted in the first Subsection of 4.3, we provide evidence that the BHCs' common stocks were undervalued during the year following the Fed's ruling. In short, this new ruling provided the BHCs' with a lower-cost financing source, of which they quickly took advantage. Table 1 shows that from October 1996 through December 1997, publicly traded BHCs issued $25 billion of TPS compared to $65 billion in similar issues raised by nonfinancial corporations over 5 years. In 1998 and 1999, only one publicly traded BHC in each year was a first-time TPS issuer. There were no new issues by BHCs in 2000 (Goldman Sachs 2000 , 2001 . Although smaller BHCs and thrifts also have used this instrument, to ensure a homogeneous sample, we study only publiclytraded BHCs.
HYPOTHESES
We examine whether issuing TPS enhances stockholder wealth, why some BHCs issue and others do not issue TPS, and why, among the issuers, some issued early and some later. We propose and test two sets of competing hypotheses. One set includes: (1) tax savings, (2) reductions in the costs of financial distress, and (3) growth opportunities. All of these hypotheses predict that TPS issues increase stockholder wealth. The second set includes: (4) moral-hazard behavior and (5) transactions costs. These hypotheses predict that at least some BHCs will not issue TPS, and that the stockholders of those that do are likely to suffer wealth losses.
Tax Savings
Since TPS have a tax advantage over common equity and ordinary preferred stock, but not over debt capital, the pure tax play is to use TPS to redeem equity, either common or preferred. Although this tax-savings event should enhance stockholder wealth, we note that until the Fed ruled that TPS would count as Tier-1 capital, no BHCs had issued these securities. TPS also can be issued as a source of additional capital to be used for general-corporate purposes.
Reduction in the Costs of Financial Distress
Laws and regulations adopted in the 1990s changed the role of regulatory capital for banks whose deposits are insured by the FDIC and for their parent BHCs. Following the substantial increase in savings-and-loan and bank failures during the 1980s, emphasis has increasingly been placed on capital as a means of reducing risks that might result in costs having to be absorbed by deposit insurance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA 1991) instituted a system of structured early intervention and resolution. As banks' capital decreases below specified percentages of assets, the banking authorities first can and then must take actions to constrain banks' activities. For example, when a bank's recorded capital drops below 2% of its assets, mandatory regulatory action is required to correct the situation. Furthermore, FDICIA makes it more difficult for the banking authorities to extend deposit-insurance protection to depositors with more than the insured amount of $100,000 per account.
The Basel Accord on capital standards for internationally active banks, implemented in the United States in 1992 for all banks and BHCs, specified two kinds of regulatory capital: Tier-1 (core capital), which must be at least 4% of riskweighted, on-balance-sheet assets along with the asset equivalent of off-balancesheet risks, and Tier-2 (supplementary capital). Together Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital make up total regulatory capital, which must be at least 8% of risk-weighted onand off-balance-sheet assets. Common and noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and related surpluses comprise Tier-1, whereas subordinated debt is included in Tier-2. Prior to the Fed's acceptance of TPS as Tier-1 capital, BHCs were constrained from using financial instruments with tax-deductible factor payments (interest) to meet their regulatory Tier-1 capital requirement.
The costs of BHC/bank financial distress take two basic forms: increased regulatory interference and increased costs of funds (capital). Regulators, who believe that inadequately capitalized banks pose a threat to the deposit-insurance safety net, can impose on BHCs and their subsidairies a range of increasingly costly actions. These include more frequent and intrusive on-site examinations, classification as a "problem bank," cease-and-desist orders, removal of officers, and removal of deposit insurance from a bank subsidiary. Under FDICIA (1991), the increasing severity of the measures relates directly to a bank's (and hence a BHC's) regulatory capital-toasset ratio. The imposition of these actions not only is costly to the BHC's stockholders, but also imposes costs on officers' time and is likely to severely damage the company's reputational capital.
BHCs with inadequate capital also will be perceived by the market as being riskier, and hence will incur higher costs of funds provided by holders of uninsured obligations. Two factors are particularly important. One is FDICIA, which imposed conditions making it more unlikely that uninsured creditors would be bailed out. 6 Indeed, Benston and Kaufman (1997) find that through 1995, the FDIC increasingly imposed losses at closed banks on uninsured creditors. The other factor is the National Depositor Preference Act of 1993, which gives priority to the FDIC and depositors over all other creditors. 7 Foreign deposits, however, are not given a preference. On balance, FDIC-uninsured and disfavored creditors are likely to demand higher yields from BHCs they perceive to be riskier.
We hypothesize that the market recognizes the advantages of issuing TPS by BHCs with relatively less regulatory capital and with more uninsured sources of funds. For these BHCs, TPS represents an addition to existing equity, which in turn leads to a corresponding reduction in the costs of financial distress. If this hypothesis is correct, these BHCs will tend to be issuers of TPS, and when issue filings are announced, this action will have a positive effect on common share value. BHCs with adequate capital also could receive a positive market response because of a substitution effect, whereby a current TPS issue results in a reduced amount of future issues of common equity.
Growth Opportunities
The climate for BHCs growth opportunities during the mid-to-late 1990s presented a prescient atmosphere. The removal of geographic and product restrictions on BHCs and banks became not a question of if they would be removed, but when. Indeed, the staged removal of nationwide restrictions on interstate branching began in 1994 with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. The Financial Modernization or Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999. Although its passage occurred beyond our test period, it was an anticipated event. In fact, the expected repeal of laws restricting or prohibiting BHCs from acquiring or merging with securities and insurance firms had been hotly debated and widely expected for several years. The mega-merger of Citicorp and Travelers Group in 1998 to form Citigroup played a major role in forcing lawmakers to act. In addition, financial innovations, such as new contracting technologies, had expanded banks' investment opportunities. On balance, BHCs had reason to expect enhanced expansion and greater investment opportunities during our sample period. Accordingly, we hypothesize that BHCs with greater growth opportunities would be more likely to issue TPS, and when the issue filings are announced, their stock prices will increase. 
Moral-Hazard Hypothesis
The moral-hazard hypothesis predicts that BHCs, particularly those that are undercapitalized, would not increase their capital by issuing TPS. These capital securities would be available to absorb losses that otherwise might be imposed on the FDIC and uninsured depositors and other fund providers. Consequently, holders of TPS should require an interest rate sufficient to compensate them for the bankruptcy risk, a cost that stockholders would bear. In effect, the value of the stockholders' deposit-insurance put options would be reduced or eliminated. However, BHC managers, who want to protect their positions and reputations, might seek to reduce the costs of regulatory discipline by issuing TPS to increase their regulatory capital, even though this might reduce stockholders' wealth. In this case, the moral-hazard hypothesis predicts that the stock prices of BHCs that issued TPS, especially undercapitalized BHCs, will decline when the issue filings are announced. However, since the banking industry was doing well over our test period, any conclusions about this hypothesis are tenuous because such behavior is most likely to occur when banks are financially distressed.
Transaction Costs
For some BHCs, the additional transaction costs associated with TPS could offset some or all of the expected benefits. Because corporate investors in TPS do not obtain the 70% dividend exclusion available to them from traditional equity issues, BHCs that had conventional preferred stock to replace, which were few, would have to pay somewhat higher yields on TPS. Nevertheless, a net after-tax advantage in yield to the issuer still would exist. BHCs interested only in the tax advantages of TPS, therefore, would have to redeem common stock, even though this would increase common stockholders' costs of financial distress.
Another potentially important cost is the higher fee charged by underwriters relative to conventional preferred-stock issues, which could absorb a portion of the issuer's tax benefit. For example, Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) find that underwriters' average fees were 2.69% for conventional preferred stock, while Irvine and Rosenfeld (2000) document an average fee of 3.15% for MIPS.
Additionally, the managers of smaller BHCs might find that the opportunity cost of learning about and evaluating TPS issues exceeds the tax benefits that might be obtained from their use. Kashyap and Stein (2000) examine a similar situation. They analyze Federal Reserve open-market reductions in demand deposits and find that smaller banks tend not to issue large CDs to compensate for those funding losses. In sum, transaction costs are likely to be greater for BHCs for which the primary (perhaps, sole) benefit is tax savings and for smaller BHCs, for which the learning costs are likely to be greater.
SAMPLE BHCS AND METHODOLOGY
Our initial sample consists of all publicly traded BHCs that had data on CRSP and reported to the Federal Reserve at the beginning and end of both 1995 and 1996, of which there were 229 in 1996 and 256 in 1997. 9 We determined those that issued TPS from three sources: Goldman, Sachs and Co., Chase Manhattan Bank, and Keefe, Bruyette and Woods. We gathered data on the SEC filing date, issue size, and use of proceeds directly from the prospectuses on the SEC's EDGAR database. If the prospectus could not be found on EDGAR, we obtained information from Security Data Corporation's database of preferred offerings. When a bank filed multiple TPS issues, we included only the initial filing.
10 Table 1 shows that from 1996 through 1999, BHCs filed $31 billion in TPS, with an average issue size of $188 million. Over this period, 162 issues were filed by 110 BHCs, of which 74 were first-time issuers. Of these, seven were omitted either because we could not locate them on CRSP or they did not have complete data on the Federal Reserve Y-9 BHC database. Since only two publicly traded BHCs had their initial filing after 1997, we excluded these observations. Our final issuer sample contains the 65 BHCs with initial filings that occurred before 1998, 25 in 1996, and 40 in 1997. We find that 22 of the 25 filings in 1996 took place in the months of November and December, with 14 taking place in December. Thereafter, no month accounted for more than six initial filings. We compare this sample of 65 BHCs with 204 BHC nonissuers in 1996 and 216 nonissuers in 1997.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We present our empirical findings in three parts. The first subsection describes our event study, which tests the hypotheses related to stockholder-wealth enhancement. The second subsection identifies the distinguishing characteristics of TPS issuers versus nonissuers, which tests why only some BHCs issued TPS and why those that did were early or late issuers. The findings from these experiments are then used in the third subsection to explain the magnitudes of the issuers' abnormal returns.
Event-Study Results
We compute abnormal returns using the CRSP Excess Returns Tape, which ranks stocks in the CRSP daily file according to the magnitude of their market-model betas. We calculate daily abnormal returns for each stock by subtracting the average daily return recorded by that stock in its beta decile from its daily raw return, and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the relevant periods.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the CAR for the entire sample of 269 BHCs and the two subsamples of TPS issuers (n ϭ 65) and nonissuers (n ϭ 204) over the 3-day interval surrounding and including day 0, the Federal Reserve's October 21 announcement date, as well as the 7-day interval from day Ϫ1 through day ϩ5. The inclusion of day Ϫ1 (the day preceding the announcement) reflects the possibility of pre-event information leakage and/or the market's anticipation of the Federal Reserve's ruling. We also include, separately, the 1-day and 5-day periods following day 0 to account for post-event drift in the abnormal returns caused by related events. Specifically, the first press coverage of the Federal Reserve's ruling did not appear until October 24 in The American Banker, a daily trade publication.
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For all the 269 BHCs, the 3-day CAR (day Ϫ1 through day ϩ1) is 0.09% and not statistically significant. 12 The 65 issuers record a CAR of just 0.23% versus a Panel A presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for BHCs that issued TPS (n ϭ 65) and a control group of nonissuers (n ϭ 204) over 3-and 7-day intervals beginning the day preceding, (day -1), October 21, 1996, the date that the Federal Reserve ruled that TPS can be classified as Tier-1 capital (day 0). Because cross-sectional standard errors would be inaccurate due to cross-sectional correlation around this date, t-statistics are calculated using the time-series standard deviation of each groups' average daily abnormal return, calculated over 200 trading days prior to October 21,1996. Panel B presents mean CARs for TPS issuers. The CARs in Panel B are computed over the days preceding (day Ϫ1) and following (day ϩ1) the filing date (day 0). Panel C subdivides the issuers into those issuers who increase their Tier 1 capital with TPS, (general purpose issuers), and those that redeem equity (replace other Tier-1 capital with TPS issues). In Panels B and C, the t-statistics are calculated from cross-sectional standard errors. All abnormal returns are calculated using the CRSP Excess Returns Tape. **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 0.05% for the 204 nonissuers and neither CAR is statistically significant. Over the longer 7-day interval, the issuers' CAR is 1.24% (t-statistic ϭ 1.96) compared to 0.57% (t-statistic ϭ 1.50) for nonissuers.
However, when we separate the issuers between the 1996 (early) filers and the 1997 (late) filers, an interesting picture emerges. 13 For the 25 early filers, the 3-day CAR is 1.40% and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (t-statistic ϭ 2.45). In contrast, the 40 late filers' CAR is Ϫ0.50%, and is not statistically significant. A difference of means test between the CARs yields a t-statistic of 2.73, significant at the 0.01 level.
14 Over the 7-day interval, the early filers' CAR is 2.26%, statistically significant at the 0.01 level (t-statistic ϭ 2.80), while the late filers' CAR is just 0.61% (t-statistic ϭ 1.08). The difference between the two groups' CARs is statistically weaker, but still significant at the 0.10 level (t-statistic ϭ 1.67). These results suggest that the market could recognize BHCs that were more likely to issue TPS early rather than later and rewarded their shareholders accordingly.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the CARs of the issuers over a 3-day filing period, where day 0 is the date that the BHC filed a TPS issue with the SEC. Because we have no way of knowing whether the issue was filed before or after the market closed on that day, we include day ϩ1 in our abnormal-return measure. Day Ϫ1 is included to account for pre-event information leakage. For the sample of 65 issuers, the 3-day CAR is 1.07%, statistically significant at the 0.01 level (t-statistic ϭ 4.41). Both early and late filers record CARs (0.93 and 1.15%, respectively) that are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Note that these CARs understate the total market response to TPS issues, particularly for 1996 issuers, because they do not include the markets' earlier reaction around October 21, 1996. We also find evidence (reported in Subsection 4.3) that the market could predict which BHCs would issue TPS, which suggests additional understatement of the CARs when the issues were filed.
These results are markedly different from previous event studies that analyze BHC preferred-stock issues. Before the TPS ruling, filing of preferred issues generated insignificant abnormal returns. Polonchek, Slovin, and Shushka (1989) find an insignificant abnormal return of 0.55% for 37 straight-preferred issues from 1975 to 1984. Cornett and Tehranian (1994) find an insignificant abnormal return of 0.14% for 47 preferred issues from 1983 to 1989, and Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) document an insignificant abnormal return of Ϫ0.08% for 65 issues of conventional preferred stock from 1982 to 1989. Wall and Peterson (1991) report an announcement-day abnormal return of Ϫ0.04% for 14 issues of conventional preferred stock by BHCs over 1982 BHCs over -1986 ; for 40 issues of mandatory convertible bonds, they report an insignificant abnormal return of 0.20%. The latter result is particularly interesting because, under the old primary-secondary scheme of classifying regulatory capital, mandatory convertible debt is the closest observed security to TPS that was tested. On balance, the results presented in Panels A and B provide evidence that issuing TPS results in benefits that more than offset any existing moral-hazard costs as well as the higher yields and other transaction costs associated with TPS. Table 2 reports the CARs based on the issuers' use of proceeds. From our detailed examination of TPS filings, news reports, and annual 10-K reports, we conclude that none of the 65 BHCs intended to use TPS proceeds to retire debt and only 11 explicitly used the proceeds to redeem equity (common or preferred stock, or both); the remainder increased their Tier-1 capital and used the proceeds for generalcorporate purposes. For the "Redeem Equity" subsample of 11 BHCs, the threeday (Ϫ1, 0, ϩ1) CAR is 0.23%, not statistically significant (t-statistic ϭ 0.41). In contrast, the other 54 firms that "Increase Tier-1 Capital" record a CAR of 1.23%, statistically significant at the 0.01 level (t-statistic ϭ 4.71). Additionally, the CARs of the two subsamples differ statistically (p-value ϭ 0.06). For the subsample of 11 firms, the retirement of outstanding equity meant that the size of the issuers' Tier-1 capital base remains essentially unchanged while, for the other group, there is both a tax-savings effect as well as an increase in Tier-1 capital. These results suggest that the Tier-1 effect rather than the tax effect is driving the market's significant positive response to the TPS filing. Nevertheless, taxes still play an important role because a BHC issuing TPS is able to achieve a higher equity base at an after-tax cost similar to debt. We examine these and other explanations of the positive CARs in Subsection 4.3.
Panel C of

Why Did Some BHCs Issue TPS while Other BHCs Did Not?
To understand why some BHCs did and did not issue TPS, the means of selected balance sheet and income-expense data of issuers are compared with those of nonissuers. We use balance-sheet data as of the year-end prior to issuance and income-expense data for that prior year. 15 The data are obtained from consolidated Y-9 financial statements, which, in most cases, are dominated by the BHCs' commercial-bank subsidiaries. We assume that these data provide valid proxies for the conditions that the BHCs expect to face following their decisions either to issue or not to issue TPS and, hence, predict those decisions.
Six reasons for BHCs to issue TPS are examined: (1) size, to account for the effects of scale and transactions costs, and as a measure of financial sophistication (four proxies); (2) taxation savings (two proxies); (3) risk that might be reduced with additional capital (three proxies); (4) funding structure, because the cost of uninsured deposits and borrowings might be reduced with additional capital (three proxies); (5) growth and investment opportunities to use the funds (four proxies); and (6) regulatory capital structure (three proxies). We make comparisons for 1996 and 1997, both to examine differences between early and later issuers and as a replication of the findings. The figures presented are averages of the various groups' numbers.
Univariate Results. The univariate findings (Table 3 ) reveal significant differences between issuers and nonissuers across both years. These differences, however, are more pronounced for the 1996 issuers. The common findings across both years show that, in the year before filing TPS, issuing BHCs were much larger institutions; had higher tax rates and relatively more preferred stock that could be replaced with tax-advantaged TPS; had relatively more FDIC-uninsured foreign 1996 or 1997. 1996 and 1997 nonissuers include all nonissuers that met the sample criteria -existing Fed Y-9 data and CRSP data in 1996 and 1997. Financial characteristics are calculated using data from year-end numbers prior to the year of issue, except for asset growth, which is calculated over a 3-year period prior to the issue year. Except for the market value of equity, which is from CRSP, the data are from the BHC Report of Condition and Report of Income (Y9) computer tapes supplied by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The risk/safety index is the sum of ROA and the ratio of capital/assets divided by the standard deviation of ROA over 5 years. The higher the index is, the safer the BHC is. Means and the probability that differences in means are equal to zero, calculated assuming unequal variances, are reported in the first line for each variable. Standard deviations and t-statistics, where appropriate, are reported in parentheses in the second line. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. deposits and borrowed funds; had greater growth and investment opportunities as shown by higher ROE (due to greater leverage rather than greater profitability per dollar of assets); and had lower Equity capital/total asset and Tier-1 ratios, but higher Tier-2 ratios. The 1996 issuers, compared to 1997 issuers, were larger, had relatively more preferred stock, relatively more FDIC-uninsured foreign deposits and borrowed funds, and lower equity and Tier-1 capital ratios, but higher Tier-2 capital ratios.
Univariate Results Going Forward. We also calculate the univariate statistics for issuers versus nonissuers for three additional years following the year prior to the TPS filing, where year ϩ1 is the end of the filing year. The distinctions between issuers and nonissuers generally remain the same, with some notable exceptions. Issuers' average tax rate in year ϩ1 is significantly higher than nonissuers', 34.2% against 32.3% (t-statistic ϭ 3.05). Issuers also grow total assets faster than nonissuers; in year ϩ1, the difference in mean growth rates, 25.6 versus 17.5%, is significant (t-statistic ϭ 1.94). This growth is reflected in a higher market-to-book ratio in year ϩ1, 2.7 versus 2.2 (t-statistic ϭ 3.88). None of these significant differences persist, however, as by year ϩ3 issuers' and nonissuers' tax liabilities, growth rates, and market-to-book ratios are statistically equal. In contrast, issuers' equity capital and Tier-1 capital ratios remain significantly below those of nonissuers in years ϩ1 through ϩ3. We conclude that issuers did not use the TPS proceeds to raise their capital ratios in line with nonissuers, but rather used them to maintain their capital ratios while funding faster asset growth than the nonissuers.
Multivariate Analyses
Since univariate tests ignore the interaction among variables, we estimate a multivariate probit model to determine the differences between issuers and nonissuers and to examine the influence of the variables as a set rather than individually. Because there are a small number of issuers in each year, we combine the data for both years. To adjust for differences between the years, we include a dummy variable, D97, which equals 1 for observations in 1997 and 0 for observations in 1996. We use the natural logarithm of total assets (ln Total assets) to represent size. The other three size variables-Total loans and leases, Market value of common equity, and Total derivatives-are not included, because they are highly correlated with total assets (Pearson correlation coefficients are 0.94, 0.94, and 0.77). An interactive term, the product of D97 and ln Total assets, tests for the effect of a shift in the diffusion of innovation (described subsequently) related to the size of early and late issuers. We include all the other variables presented in Table 3 , with two exceptions: we exclude ROE because it is driven primarily by leverage (Equity capital/total assets), while Tier-2 capital to risk-weighted assets is omitted because Equity capital/total assets captures its dimension. Table 4 presents the results for three alternative probit models in which the dependent variable is defined as Issuers ϭ 1 and Nonissuers ϭ 0. Model [1] includes all of the variables. As a robustness check, model [2] excludes ln Total assets and ln Total assets *D97, because BHC size is correlated with several of the other a Multivariate probit analysis of variables associated with BHCs' Issuing (ϭ1) or Not Issuing (ϭ0) TPS in 1996 and 1997. For each variable, the associated coefficient is presented in the first line and P-values for a test of coefficients equal to zero is presented in the second line. Model Concordance is the percentage of outcomes correctly predicted by the model. Tier-1 capital was not reported for 8 nonissuers in 1996; hence they are excluded. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
independent variables. Model [3] uses Tier-1 capital to risk-weighted assets in place of total equity to total assets.
For all three models, D97 is positive and highly significant (probability that the coefficient equals zero is less than 0.01), which reflects the greater number of (late) issuers in 1997. Consistent with our univariate analysis, the coefficient on ln Total assets also is positive and highly significant. The interaction of this variable with D97 is significantly negative, indicating that in 1997 there was a smaller positive relationship between size and the probability of issuance. These findings are consistent with the notion of financial innovation as a diffusion process that starts with larger and more financially sophisticated firms and trickles down to other firms. 16 Four other variables have coefficients that are always statistically significant at the 0.05 level: Preferred stock/total assets and Asset growth over the prior 3 years each have positive coefficients, and Equity capital/total assets or Tier-1 capital/riskweighted assets have significantly negative coefficients. In addition, the ratio of Foreign deposits to total assets has a significantly negative coefficient in models [2] and [3] , for which ln Total assets is omitted. The coefficient of Loans and leases/total assets is negative, but is significant only in model [3] , while Taxes paid/net income before taxes and return on assets (ROA) are positive and significant at the 0.05 level in model [2] .
Although the multivariate and univariate analyses are generally consistent, one exception stands out. The Asset-growth and ROA proxies for BHCs' investment opportunities play a more important role when interaction among the variables is permitted. The probability of a BHC issuing TPS appears positively related to its size and investment opportunities, extent of funding with foreign deposits, and relative capital shortfall as measured by total equity or Tier-1 risk-adjusted capital ratios.
All three models do a good job predicting security issuance. The chi-square statistic for each model is strongly significant, and the concordance of the models' prediction with eventual issuance is quite high. If we can use existing financial information to predict TPS issuance, then we would expect that the market could do so as well. The estimated probability of issuance from these models is significantly positively correlated with the 3-day announcement affect surrounding the Fed's ruling. For example, using model [1] , the correlation between the estimated probability of issuance and the Fed-announcement return is 0.44.
What Explains the TPS-Issuing BHCs' CARs? Next, we seek to explain the magnitude of the 3-day CARs when the TPS filings were announced by the 65 BHCs reported in Panel B of Table 2 . We employ the variables used for the multivariate-probit analysis that excludes ln Total assets and D97 (reported in models [2] and [3] of Table 4) , with one substitution and one addition. We replace Preferred stock/ total assets with a more precise and inclusive measure, Retire Tier-1 capital, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a BHC retired existing Tier-1 capital (common or preferred stock or both). Following Cornett and Tehranian (1994) , we also include a new variable, Offer size/total assets, where offer size is defined as the dollar amount in the TPS offering prospectus. 17 We present four models: three based on levels of variables and one based on changes. The first two levels models include all of the variables, but with alternative capital ratio measures of capital adequacy (Equity capital/total assets or Tier-1 capital/risk-weighted assets). The third level model includes only variables that are statistically significant in the multivariate-probit analysis presented in Table 4 . The fourth model is based on changes in the variables that were significant in predicting TPS issuance in Table 4 , measured over the year in which the TPS were issued. 18 The probit analysis presented in Table 4 also indicates that the market can predict, to some extent, which BHCs would file a TPS issue. Consequently, at least a portion of the market value of the issue would have been reflected in issuers' stock price before the issue was filed. However, even when partially anticipated, the filing can reveal significant new information to the market (Chaplinsky and Hansen, 1993) . For example, two significant pieces of information that we can identify, i.e., the use of funds (e.g., retire equity) and magnitude of the change in capitalization (the offer size), are not known until the filing date, and both variables help explain the cross-sectional reaction to the filing.
The data in Table 5 are censored in the sense that we can observe the independent variables for all potential issuers, but the dependent variable only for those BHCs who actually issued TPS. Further, since all of the independent variables in the multivariate analysis are in the markets' information set prior to the date of issue, we have already demonstrated that the identity of the BHCs that choose to file is predictable. In this case, standard OLS cross-sectional estimation is, at best, less powerful than conditional event-study methods (Prabhala, 1997, and Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams 1990) . Instead of OLS, we estimate a conditional event study using a maximum likelihood procedure analogous to Heckman's (1979) two-step method. Heckman's method is appropriate for both the censored data and the voluntary nature of the issue decision. Essentially, the procedure involves adding a regressor, the inverse Mill's ratio, to the standard OLS cross-sectional regression technique to control for the censored nature of the data. The inverse Mill's ratio is estimated from a probit model, in our case model [1] from Table 4 . Lambda, λ, the coefficient of the inverse Mill's ratio, measures the extent to which the market's ability to predict a TPS filing affects abnormal returns on the filing date. 19 To determine statistical significance, we follow Greene (1991) , who provides a consistent estimate of the standard errors for Heckman's method.
The results are presented in Table 5 . For the levels models [1, 2, 3] , the capitalratio variables and ROA are statistically significant. The coefficients of the relative capital variables are all negative (the lower the capital ratio, the greater the abnormal return), showing that the market rewards relatively poorly capitalized BHCs that increase their capital ratios. The estimated coefficients for ROA are positive and significant in models [1] and [3] . This result suggests that the market rewards issuers that have profitably employed capital in the past. The coefficient on Retire equity is significantly negative in all the models. Thus, although BHCs that retire equity receive the tax-shield from TPS, they do not appear to be as well rewarded by the market if they do not use the proceeds of the issue to increase their Tier-1 capital. This suggests that factors other than the tax shield provided by TPS are driving the positive abnormal returns. Offer size is significantly positively related to abnormal returns. On balance, then, the larger the TPS component in the banks' capital structure, the larger is the abnormal return. These findings are consistent with those reported by Cornett and Tehranian (1994) . They find that both Offer size/total assets and the announcement of voluntary equity issues are significantly negatively related to abnormal returns surrounding banks' common-stock issues. In both studies, the ' 3-day (Ϫ1, 0, ϩ1) cumulative abnormal returns, where day 0 is the filing date of a BHC's first TPS issue. Coefficients and t-statistics (second line) are presented for each variable. The continuous independent variables are calculated at the end of the calendar year prior to the announcement of TPS issue. Retire equity is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for the 11 BHCs (16.9%) that retire existing Tier-1 capital in the year following the TPS issue. Lambda (λ) is the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman specification. Model 3 includes the variables that are significant in the financial-statement analysis presented in Table 3 . In Model 4, the independent variables are the Changes in the independent variables measured over the filing year. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. ***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
larger the issue size, the greater is the stock market effect. It should also be noted that when Cornett and Tehranian (1994) replicate their tests on conventional preferred stock, they find an insignificant positive response between offer size and abnormal returns.
The model in Column [4] regresses abnormal returns on the changes in the variables that were significant predictors of TPS issuance in Table 4 over the year (tϩ1) in which TPS issues were filed. This specification can determine if the contemporaneous changes (rather than prior year data) can enhance our explanation of the market reaction to TPS filings. These results show significant positive effects arising from contemporaneous tax liability and asset growth. Banks with increases in tax liabilities have higher abnormal returns. Specifically, a 100 basis-point increase in a sample bank's tax rate is associated with a 9 basis-point (0.09) increase in its 3-day CAR. Thus, we cannot dismiss the tax-shield feature of TPS as unimportant to the issuers. Growth opportunities, as measured by the market-to-book ratio and past asset growth, are not significant in the three levels models. However, these variables could be poor proxies for future growth opportunities. As an alternative, we test whether the change in year t ϩ 1 asset growth is associated with the filing date abnormal return. We find that changes in asset growth rates are marginally significant predictors of the abnormal return (coefficient estimator ϭ 0.05, t-statistic ϭ 1.72). The significant coefficients on Offer size/total assets, combined with the knowledge that issuers do not use the proceeds to improve their future capital ratios (see second Subsection of 4.2), provide evidence that issuers use TPS cost effectively. Specifically, they fund growth while maintaining capital ratios strong enough to ensure that they retain the confidence of the market despite their riskier funding structure. On balance, issuing TPS is not perceived as a sign of financial distress, but rather as a cost-effective way of maintaining Tier-1 capital ratios.
As an alternative, fast growing BHCs could issue common stock to maintain their Tier-1 capital. However, as Polonchek, Shuska, and Slovin (1989) argue, bank managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they think their shares are undervalued. It follows, therefore, that capital-hungry BHCs would voluntarily sell common stocks when they believe that the security is overpriced. Supporting this view, Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998) report that commercial banks that voluntarily sell common stock experience a statistically significant CAR of Ϫ14.44% over the 3-year post-issue period. They argue that this finding is evidence that the banks' common stock was overvalued when issued. In contrast, for our sample of 65 TPS issuers, the CAR over 1-year period beginning 2 days after the TPS filing was 20.32% (statistically significant at the 0.01 level), evidence that their common equity was undervalued at the time of the filing. 20 This result could also explain why there was an explosion in TPS filings following the Federal Reserve's October 21, 1996 ruling. That is, these BHCs apparently were in need of Tier-1 capital during this period, but were reluctant to sell common stock because they believed (correctly) that it was undervalued. However, the new ruling provided them with a lower-cost financing alternative of which they promptly took advantage.
Lastly, we examine lambda (λ), the coefficient on the inverse Mill's ratio. The coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level in model [2] and at the 0.10 level in model [3] , which indicates that the market, indeed, does predict which BHCs will issue TPS. It is possible to estimate what the filing return would have been if the market did not anticipate the event. For example, using model [1] , we estimate that, if the market were completely surprised, the 3-day abnormal return on the filing date would have been 1.49%, 42 basis points above the actual reaction of 1.07% (Table 2 , Panel B).
The moral-hazard hypothesis predicts negative abnormal returns for BHCs that increased their capital with TPS issues and lower (more negative) abnormal returns for BHCs with relative less capital. Table 2 reports positive abnormal returns to issuers, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. As reported in Table 5 , the coefficients on Equity capital/total assets and Tier-1 capital/risk-weighted assets are significantly negative. These results are not consistent with those expected if the moral-hazard hypothesis was operative and valid.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
No BHCs issued TPS until after the Federal Reserve permitted them to include this security in their regulatory Tier-1 capital. The importance of regulatory requirements for BHCs is shown by our event-study findings, which show that early (1996) issuers of TPS record significantly positive CARs over selected intervals, beginning when the Federal Reserve first announced it would accept TPS for Tier-1 capital. Further, the 65 BHCs that subsequently filed a TPS issue with the SEC record significantly positive additional abnormal returns over a 3-day TPS filing period. These results can be attributed primarily to those BHCs that used the issue proceeds to increase Tier-1 capital, as opposed to those that use TPS only as a substitute for existing Tier-1 capital.
From the univariate tests, we find that issuers compared to nonissuers are larger, have higher tax rates and relatively more preferred stock, more uninsured deposits and borrowed funds, and relatively less total equity. These differences are more pronounced for the early (1996) issuers than late (1997) issuers. Multivariate probit models generally confirm the univariate findings and show that issuers and nonissuers come from distinct groups.
We find evidence that the BHCs' common stock was undervalued during the filing period, supporting the view that their TPS filings were principally motivated by an opportunity to add to their Tier-1 capital base without issuing costly common equity. The stockholders of BHCs generally benefited from the TPS issues, and those with relatively lower capital ratios gained even more. This is a unique result, since TPS is the only equity security to date that provides clear benefits to BHCs' stockholders. The positive share-price reaction occurs even though almost all BHCs held more than the regulatory minimum amount of capital (relative to assets). A regulatory emphasis on Tier-1 capital appears to have given BHCs incentives to exceed the minimum required ratio. Market forces, as evidenced by the effect of uninsured sources of funds on BHCs' desired capital ratios, also encourage BHCs to hold relatively more capital. When the tax disadvantage of Tier-1 capital is removed, BHCs that can achieve greater tax benefits, have relatively lower capital, and are funded with more uninsured funds, and are more likely than other BHCs to issue TPS.
One policy implication that can be derived from our study is that Tier-1 capital should include subordinated debentures as well as TPS. Subordinated debentures have the same tax-avoidance properties as TPS, with the additional advantage of being less costly to underwrite. 21 Allowing banks, as well as BHCs, to use both securities to meet their capital requirements would lower their cost of capital and reduce the risk of bank failures to the FDIC and taxpayers. It also gives managers an alternative to issuing common equity when they think their common stock is undervalued. The results of this study also suggest that both bankers and investors would benefit from this regulatory change.
NOTES
15. We could not use quarterly income-statement data to obtain numbers closer to the TPS filing date, as only annual numbers were available from the Federal Reserve. We used balance-sheet data from the quarter just prior to the filing date and found no significant change in the results presented herein.
16. Kane (1983) describes innovation as a diffusion process. 17. Since several filings were shelf offerings, where the total amount filed was significantly larger than the initial offering size, this variable was alternatively defined as the amount of the initial offering with similar results.
18. We chose this period primarily because the results in second Subection of 4.2 show that year ϩ1 is the period in which these variables were significantly different for issuers.
19. Technically, l equals the correlation between the errors in the probit selection model (Table 4 ) and the error term in the OLS estimation of the regressions in Table 5 , multiplied by the standard deviation of the OLS error.
20. We compute abnormal returns using the CRSP Excess Returns Tape. Daily abnormal returns are cumulated over the day ϩ2 to day ϩ256 interval following the filing date.
21. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000) and Shadow Financial Regulatory committee (2000) for discussions and analyses of other regulatory benefits derived from banks and BHCs issuing subordinated debentures.
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